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1. Introduction 
As indicated, for example, by Johnson-Laird (2010, p. 204), the syntactic theories, 
that is, the theories supporting the idea that there are formal schemata in the human 
mind that lead inferential processes, need to resort to hidden premises to explain 
some experimental results that are to be found in the literature on cognitive science. 
Such premises are necessary to account for the role of pragmatics in those processes, 
since they reveal the way general knowledge can act in human activity. Actually, it 
cannot be stated that the syntactic theories are a homogenous whole, as under that 
designation many approaches can be included, simply some examples being that of 
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Braine & O’Brien, 1998a, O’Brien, 2009, 2014; O’Brien & Li, 2013), or that of Rips 
(1994). However, most of them refer or, at least, seem to be compatible with the idea 
of the pragmatic action of hidden premises (for a discussion, as far as the particular 
case of the mental logic theory is concerned, see, e.g., López-Astorga, 2016a). For 
this reason, I will not assume any of the mentioned frameworks in entirety in this 
paper and only try to offer a general explanation acceptable for all of them. In this 
way, I will work here, as it is done, for instance, in López-Astorga (2014), under the 
hypothesis that the human mind makes inferences following a system with formal 
schemata directly derived from texts such as those of Deaño (1999) or Gentzen 
(1934, 1935), that is, following standard logical calculus. There is no doubt that, as 
also indicated by López-Astorga (2014, pp. 131-132), accepting this hypothesis can 
be controversial, since several of the syntactic theories intend to move away from 
classical logic, the cause of this being that some experiments have revealed that some 
of the requirements of this last logic are not always fulfilled by participants (a clear 
example in this regard can be the mental logic theory). Nevertheless, this will not be 
a real problem here (as it is not in López-Astorga, 2014, either), as the arguments that 
will be provided do not refer to aspects of standard calculus that cause 
inconveniences and that, therefore, are not admitted by some syntactic theories. 
Thus, my main aim here is to show that, while it is evident that the idea that there 
are hidden premises that play a role in human intellectual activity is a very strong 
assumption, it is also obvious that we can easily find evidence in favor of it. In 
particular, I will focus on an argument given by Deng Xi, an ancient Chinese 
philosopher, in order to support the thesis that, on the one hand, Deng Xi’s argument 
can only be understood if it is assumed that indeed hidden premises coming from 
general knowledge undertake pragmatic actions that have an influence on the 
interpretation of discourses, and, on the other hand, that, hence, that very argument 
confirms the existence of hidden premises in human thinking.  
To do all of this, firstly, I will better explain the role that hidden premises can 
play in the syntactic theories. Then, I will give a very brief description of Deng Xi’s 
philosophical context, the text in which the argument that will be analyzed is, and the 
reasons that could lead him to raise arguments such as that one. Finally, I will 
propose an account of why the argument can be considered evidence that the 
hypothesis of hidden premises is correct and suitably interpreted only if that very 
hypothesis is accepted. So, I begin by describing in more detail the function that 
hidden premises can perform in the syntactic theories. 
 
2. Hidden premises coming from general knowledge 
Maybe the best way to show how hidden premises can work is by means of an 
example, and, in this case, I will consider one based on a sentence taken from Orenes 
and Johnson-Laird (2012) and that these last writers use with goals very different 
from mine (they are not proponents of any syntactic theory). The sentence is as 
follows: 
“… Ana read Don Quixote or she read a novel” (Orenes & Johnson-Laird, 2012, 
p. 375; italics added). 
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If we suppose that this sentence is the first premise of an inference and that the 
second one is ‘Ana did not read a novel’, we come to a problematic situation from 
the logical point of view. Certainly, given that my working hypothesis is, as said, that 
the human mind makes inferences following standard calculus, these equivalences 
can be provided: 
p: Ana read Don Quixote 
q: Ana read a novel 
∨: disjunction 
¬: negation 
Thus, the two premises can be formalized in this way: 
p ∨ q 
¬q 
And the conclusion in classical logic is clear: p. 
 True, in standard calculus (and not only in it, as the schema reproduces the formal 
structure of Modus Tollendo Ponens, a schema that was valid in a logic as ancient as 
the Stoic one), p ∨ q, ¬q ∴ p (where ‘∴’ means that the right formula can be derived 
from the left formulae), which leads to an absurd scenario: Ana did not read a novel 
(¬q) but she read Don Quixote (p), the problem being, of course, that Don Quixote is 
a well known Spanish novel. 
Nevertheless, if we accept the hypothesis that general knowledge provides hidden 
premises with pragmatic value, we can say that individuals know, for example, that 
¬q → ¬p (where ‘→’ represents the logical conditional), that is, that, if Ana did not 
read a novel, then she did not read Don Quixote, and that, therefore, the second 
premise (¬q) along with this last hidden premise enables to deduce, via Modus 
Ponendo Ponens (i.e., another schema coming from the Stoic system), ¬p (i.e., that 
Ana did not read Don Quixote) as well. And this can explain why nothing is really 
deduced. The premises are not p ∨ q and ¬q, but p ∨ q, ¬q, and ¬q → ¬p, and, as 
indicated, p ∨ q, ¬q, and ¬q → ¬p ∴ p ∧ ¬p (where ‘∧’ denotes conjunction). So, 
there is no doubt that this last contradiction can stop the inferential process and cause 
one to derive no formula. 
Nonetheless, a new difficulty arises here. As it is known, in standard logic there is 
a principle usually called ‘Ex Contradictione Quodlibet Sequitur’, which provides 
that all of the formulae that can be thought can be derived from a contradiction such 
as p ∧ ¬p. However, this problem is not hard to solve either. Theories such as the one 
of the mental logic have proposed in this regard that this is precisely one of the 
aspects that differentiate the real logic the human mind follows from classical logic. 
In the real mental logic, contradictions are never linked to the aforementioned 
principle, but only to Reductio ad Absurdum processes, which only reveal that at a 
minimum one of the suppositions is false (see, e.g., Braine & O’Brien, 1998b, p. 
206). Nevertheless, beyond the difficulties that this solution can have too (see, e.g., 
for a discussion, López-Astorga, 2016b, pp. 46-47), it is not really necessary. The 
problem disappears if we simply note that, from a cognitive point of view, the 
possibility to derive all of the formulae that can be constructed is very akin to the 
possibility to derive nothing. Indeed, in both of those cases, there is no significant 
information that allows one to continue the inference having a certain security. If 
nothing can be drawn, the inference just cannot continue. If every possible formula 
can be drawn, given that whenever something is derived, it is possible to derive its 
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negation as well, no certainty can be achieved about anything. So, in this last case, 
the more suitable attitude also seems to be not to come to any conclusion and to 
claim nothing about the truth value of any formula, that is, to stop the inferential 
process too. 
In any case, this is only an example of the way hidden premises coming from 
general knowledge can work. What is interesting for this paper is that it is possible to 
find real circumstances and discourses in which such premises are actually present 
and which can only be understood paying attention to them. As said, that is the case 
of an argument offered by Deng Xi. But before analyzing that argument, it appears to 
be necessary to give some data about this thinker.  
 
3. Deng Xi and the theory of liang ke 
According to Fraser (2017), Deng Xi, who died in 501 B.C.E., was a representative 
of the named ‘School of Names (ming jia)’, which was concerned about the 
relationships between words and things. However, his aspects more relevant here can 
be that, also following Fraser (2017), The Annals of Lü Buwei, Book 18, show him 
using rhetoric and putting forward that it is difficult to clearly distinguish concepts 
such as ‘right’ and ‘wrong’, and ‘admissible’ and ‘inadmissible’, and that, in 
connection with any issue, two speeches are possible, one of them in favor of an idea 
and the other one against that very idea (the theory providing that ‘both sides are 
admissible’ or ‘liang ke’). 
Obviously, these characteristics remind of Greek sophists, and a fragment 
reproduced by Fraser (2017) and taken from the aforementioned annals (in 
particular, the fragment is in Book 18.4/453) makes it even more evident that, 
indeed, Deng Xi thought that every matter admits two opposite discourses. The 
text is as follows: 
“The Wei river was extremely high. A person from the house of a rich man of 
Zheng drowned. Someone found the body. The rich man asked to buy it back. 
The man demanded very much money. The rich man told Deng Xi about it. Deng 
Xi said, ‘Calm down about it. There’s certainly no one else he can sell it to’. The 
one who found the body was troubled by this and told Deng Xi about it. Deng Xi 
replied to him too by saying, ‘Calm down about it. There’s certainly nowhere else 
they can buy it’”. 
However, if reviewed in detail, this text is really problematic. We cannot truly 
observe two contrary speeches in it because actually what is said to the rich man (i.e., 
that there is no one else he can sell it to) is not inconsistent with what is said to the 
other man (i.e., that there is nowhere else they can buy it). And this is so because, 
clearly, the fact that the man who found the body can only sell it to the rich man is 
not, in principle, incompatible with the fact that the rich man can only buy the body 
to the man who found it. It is possible even to think that the two answers are both of 
them true at the same time, the reason of it being that they refer to two different 
aspects of reality that do not have a necessary influence on each other (that there is 
only one possible buyer does not necessarily imply that there is only one possible 
seller, or vice versa). 
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But this evidently raises an immediate question. If there is no explicit 
contradiction between the two answers given by Deng Xi in the previous fragment, 
why do we tend to consider them to be incoherent and think that texts such as that 
one enable to deem Deng Xi as a ‘Chinese sophist’ similar to the Greek ones? The 
response to this last question is clear: the reason is that the answers offered by Deng 
Xi refer to hidden premises. The next section is intended to show this. 
 
 
4. Deng Xi’s argumentation and its hidden premises 
To describe the hidden premises that can be identified in Deng Xi’s 
argumentation above and how they can work in the human mind, I will resort to first-
order predicate logic. This can seem incorrect, since the previous explanation of the 
role of that kind of premises in the syntactic theories has been presented in terms of 
propositional calculus. However, it is not a problem either. On the one hand, the 
relationships between those two types of logic are evident and it is known that any 
formula expressed by means of symbols of one of them can be easily translated into 
another formula with symbols of the other one (see, e.g., Deaño, 1999). On the other 
hand, some of the syntactic theories have also proposed predicate logics considered a 
natural development of its propositional logics and absolutely complementary to 
them (see, e.g., for the particular case of the mental logic theory, Braine, 1998). So, it 
can be thought that it is clearly justified to use first order predicate calculus if, as 
mentioned, the working hypothesis of this paper is that standard logic controls 
human thinking. 
That said, to formalize the first answer responded by Deng Xi, that is, that the 
man who found the body can only sell it to the rich man, these equivalences can be 
assumed: 
Sxy: x sells to y 
a: the man who found the body 
b: the rich man 
∃: the existential quantifier 
x ≠ y: x is different from y 
Thus, the logical form of that response can be: 
¬∃ [(x ≠ b) ∧ Sax] 
That is, there is no x so that x is different from b and a sells to x. 
 Hence, this formula indicates that b is the only possible buyer. However, people 
know that, if somebody is the only buyer, then he/she is in a rather advantageous 
position with regard to the seller, and that he/she can become who finally makes a 
decision on the price of the sale. In this way, a new equivalence can be this one: 
Dx: x makes the decision (in this case, as said, on the price) 
And it can be claimed that the previous formula is always linked to this hidden 
premise by pragmatics: 
Db ∧ ¬ Da 
That is, b makes the decision and a does not make the decision. 
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As far as the second answer (that is, that the rich man can only buy the body to 
the man who found it) is concerned, only one more equivalence is needed to show its 
logical form: 
Bxy: x buys to y 
And with it, it is possible to build this other formula: 
¬∃x [(x ≠ a) ∧ Bbx] 
That is, there is no x so that x is different from a and b buys to x. 
Therefore, this last formula states that a is the only seller. Nevertheless, this 
formula has a hidden premise provided by pragmatics as well. People also know that, 
if somebody is the only seller, he/she is who can make the decision on the final price, 
that is, they know that 
Da ∧ ¬Db 
That is, a makes the decision and b does not make the decision. 
So, the contradiction is obvious. Given that ¬∃x [(x ≠ b) ∧ Sax] is true, Db ∧ ¬Da 
is also so, and because ¬∃ [(x ≠ a) ∧ Bbx] is true, Da ∧ ¬Db is so too. But Db ∧ ¬Da 
and Da ∧ ¬Db express the contrary and are hence inconsistent, which means that, 
while it is true that the responses given by Deng Xi are incompatible, they are so 
only because of their pragmatic premises, and not because of themselves. The first of 
the answers implies, by virtue of pragmatics, that the rich man is who makes the 
decision on the price, and not the man who found the body. On the contrary, what 
pragmatics indicates in the case of the second one is that the decision is made by the 
man who found the body, and not by the rich man. Clearly, at the same time as this 
Deng Xi’s argument gives support to the hypothesis of hidden premises, it is hard to 
correctly interpret it ignoring the existence of such premises. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Therefore, the previous account shows not only that the idea of hidden premises 
given by pragmatics makes sense, but also that a framework based on a system 
more or less akin to standard logic does as well. In this way, it can even be 
thought that this paper reveals how a framework of that kind can have the 
necessary resources to explain certain facts difficult to understand from a 
radically different approach. 
Undoubtedly, nowadays it is very hard to claim that human reasoning works 
just following standard calculus, since, as said, several studies have shown that 
people do not always respect all of its requirements (see also, e.g., Orenes & 
Johnson-Laird, 2012). And, on the other hand, certain problems have been 
detected in particular syntactic theories such as the one of the mental logic as 
well (see, e.g., López-Astorga, 2016b). However, that does not mean that any 
syntactic system is not possible. Standard logic and the mental logic theory are 
not the only syntactic proposals that can be thought. Of course, it is totally 
feasible to raise approaches similar to those ones and that, nevertheless, are 
able to overcome the problems or difficulties that can be attributed to 
frameworks such as those very systems.  
Indeed, modifications can always be done. As seen above, the mental logic 
theory introduces an important change with regard to standard calculus. 
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According to the former, the Ex Contradictione Quodlibet Sequitur principle 
must be ignored. As also indicated, this change may not be absolutely 
necessary. Nonetheless, it demonstrates that minor modifications are possible in 
any syntactic theory, and that hence, by virtue of such modifications, we can 
construct by degrees an actual model of the human intellectual dynamic that 
can finally really describe how the human being reasons and carries out 
linguistic and communicative activities. Thus, the construction process of that 
model can lead us to a theory that is consistent with most of the experimental 
results that are to be found in specialized literature. 
As pointed out, the arguments of this paper reveal that to try to build that 
model is not an absurd task. So, it is evident that it is worth continuing to look 
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